\u3ci\u3eGraham\u3c/i\u3e on the Ground by Drinan, Cara H.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 87 Number 1 
3-1-2012 
Graham on the Ground 
Cara H. Drinan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Juvenile Law Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cara H. Drinan, Graham on the Ground, 87 Wash. L. Rev. 51 (2012). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol87/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 





GRAHAM ON THE GROUND 
Cara H. Drinan 
Abstract: In Graham v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court held that it is unconstitutional to 
sentence a non-homicide juvenile offender to life in prison without parole. While states need 
not guarantee release to these juvenile offenders, they cannot foreclose such an outcome at 
the sentencing phase. Scholars have identified several long-term ramifications of Graham, 
including its likely influence on juvenile sentencing practices and on retributive justice 
theory. As yet unexamined, though, are the important and thorny legal questions that Graham 
raises for state judges and lawmakers in the very short term. To whom does the Graham 
decision apply? What is the appropriate remedy for those inmates? What affirmative 
obligations does the Graham decision impose upon the states? This Article endeavors to 
answer these and other pressing questions that confront judges and legislators today. Part I 
briefly describes the Graham opinion and surveys what scholars to date have identified as 
salient aspects of the decision. Part II seeks to provide a blueprint for lower courts and 
legislatures implementing the Graham decision. Specifically, it argues that: (1) Graham is 
retroactively applicable to all inmates who received a life-without-parole sentence for a 
juvenile non-homicide crime; (2) those inmates entitled to relief under Graham require 
effective representation at their resentencing hearings; (3) judges presiding over resentencing 
hearings should err in favor of rehabilitation over retribution to comport with the spirit of 
Graham; and (4) long-term legislative and executive action are necessary in order to make 
Graham’s promise a reality. Finally, Part III situates Graham in the context of our nation’s 
ongoing criminal justice failings. While the sentence challenged in Graham ought to be 
viewed as a symptom of such failings, the Graham decision may offer a window of hope for 
reform on that same front. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Graham v. Florida,1 the U.S. Supreme Court held that it is 
unconstitutional to sentence a non-homicide juvenile offender to life in 
prison without parole.2 The Court was careful to note that “[a] State is 
not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender 
convicted of a nonhomicide crime,” but it must provide the offender 
with “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on 
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”3 Dissenting in Graham, 
Justice Thomas objected to the Court’s newly crafted categorical Eighth 
Amendment rule on several grounds, including the concern that the 
decision was destined to raise a host of vexing collateral legal issues: 
The Court holds that “[a] State is not required to guarantee 
eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a 
nonhomicide crime,” but must provide the offender with “some 
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation.” But what, exactly, does such a 
“meaningful” opportunity entail? When must it occur? And what 
Eighth Amendment principles will govern review by the parole 
boards the Court now demands that States empanel? The Court 
                                                     
1. 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 2030. 
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provides no answers to these questions, which will no doubt 
embroil the courts for years.4 
As Justice Thomas predicted, lower courts and legislatures have 
struggled with how to implement the decision since Graham was 
decided in 2010. To begin, there is the question of who benefits from the 
Graham decision.5 Courts are split on the question whether Graham is 
retroactively applicable,6 while recent changes in state law have enlarged 
the pool of inmates to whom Graham applies.7 
At the same time, judges must determine what sentences are 
constitutional after Graham for non-homicide juvenile offenders. The 
Graham Court held that a judge may not impose a life-without-parole 
sentence on a non-homicide juvenile offender, but what about a parole-
eligible life sentence? Or a sentence of seventy-five years? Since the 
Court announced the Graham decision, close to twenty juvenile inmates 
in Florida have been resentenced, and there has been a wide range of 
sentences imposed: while one inmate received a resentence of 30 years, 
another received a resentence of 170 years.8 Despite Justice Alito’s 
contention that “[n]othing in the Court’s opinion affects the imposition 
of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility of parole,”9 the 
logic of the majority’s opinion suggests that there must, in fact, be an 
upper limit on what sentences will comport with Graham.10 State court 
judges are faced with discerning what that upper limit is, and, as one 
Florida judge presiding over a juvenile sentencing said, “It’s a huge 
dilemma.”11 
                                                     
4. Id. at 2057 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
5. After the Court’s decision in Graham, the Florida Bar Foundation awarded Barry University 
Law School a $100,000 grant to “address the legal and policy questions raised by the Graham 
decision, as well as individual client needs.” Nancy Kinnally, Foundation Supports Efforts to 
Ensure Fair Sentencing for Juveniles, FLA. B. NEWS (Oct. 15, 2010), 
http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/jnnews01.nsf/8c9f13012b96736985256aa900624829/74f9f
03449b09276852577b2006aed4e!OpenDocument. Identifying the inmates to whom Graham applies 
was one of the Barry Law School clinical program’s initial challenging tasks. Id. 
6. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.  
7. See, e.g., Manuel v. State, 48 So. 3d 94, 97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that Graham 
applies to a defendant convicted of attempted murder because, under Florida law, homicide requires 
the death of human being); see also infra notes 118–119 and accompanying text.  
8. Shemir Wiles, Sentenced a Second Time, Man Given 170 Years: Jessie Cade’s Life Sentence 
Voided by Graham v. Florida, CITRUS COUNTY CHRON. (Jan. 27, 2011), 
http://www.chronicleonline.com/content/sentenced-second-time-man-given-170-years; see also Jeff 
Kunerth, Dangerous but Different: ‘Lifers’ Sentenced as Teens Get 2nd Chance, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL, Apr. 3, 2011, at A1 [hereinafter Kunerth, ‘Lifers’ Sentenced as Teens Get 2nd Chance].  
9. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
10. See infra Part II.C. 
11. Alexandra Zayas, Judges Ponder Tricky Ruling, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 6, 2010, at 3A 
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State lawmakers are also grappling with an appropriate response to 
Graham. For example, in Florida, where most of the inmates affected by 
the Graham decision are incarcerated, the state legislature had 
previously eliminated parole for most felony convicts.12 At the very 
least, Graham suggests that parole needs to be available for juvenile 
offenders under state law, and states housing Graham inmates13 need to 
craft an appropriate parole protocol specific to juvenile offenders. 
Florida Representative Michael Weinstein proposed legislation that 
would give juvenile defendants affected by the Graham decision the 
opportunity for parole after twenty-five years, assuming the inmates met 
certain criteria, such as good behavior in prison and obtaining a GED.14 
The Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association similarly suggested 
giving juvenile convicts the possibility of parole after twenty years, but 
then-Governor Charlie Crist rejected both proposals as too lenient.15 A 
“Graham Law” is pending before Florida’s legislature, but lawmakers 
have not been able to agree on the meaning of terms such as “maturity, 
rehabilitation and parole,” all of which are crucial to pending 
legislation.16 
 Even if legislators can agree on a law to guide judges in their 
sentencing decisions, the Graham Court’s aspiration demands additional 
measures. In particular, the Graham decision placed great emphasis on 
the theme of rehabilitation and the promise of possible, if not eventual, 
release.17 Justice Kennedy wrote that “[t]he juvenile should not be 
deprived of the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-
recognition of human worth and potential.”18 Without even the 
possibility of future release, he further explained, juvenile offenders 
have no incentive to “become . . . responsible individual[s]” or to engage 
in the “considered reflection which is the foundation for remorse, 
                                                     
(quoting Circuit Judge Chet A. Tharpe).  
12. Dolan v. State, 618 So. 2d 271, 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (“For anyone convicted of a 
non-capital felony committed on or after October 1, 1983, the term ‘parole’ no longer exists.” 
(citing FLA. STAT. § 921.001(8) (1983)).  
13. There is some debate as to the question of which inmates fall within the purview of the 
Graham decision. I address this issue below in Part II.C. 
14. Zayas, supra note 11. 
15. Id.  
16. Jeff Kunerth, Dangerous but Different: Bill: Juvenile Lifers Wait 25 Years for Way Out, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 13, 2011, at A1 [hereinafter Kunerth, Juvenile Lifers Wait 25 Years for 
Way Out].  
17. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029–30 (2010). 
18. Id. at 2032.  
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renewal, and rehabilitation.”19 In light of this language, the Court’s 
decision imposes certain affirmative obligations on the states. Not only 
must the states leave open the possibility of eventual release, but they 
must also create the opportunity for reflection and maturity through 
appropriate conditions of confinement for juvenile offenders.20 This is a 
daunting task, as most states are barely able to ensure the physical safety 
of their juvenile inmates,21 let alone facilitate their healthy maturation. 
In these ways, Justice Thomas was correct: the Graham decision has 
raised a host of collateral legal issues that state judges, legislatures, and 
policymakers need to address. These issues—the tasks of implementing 
Graham on the ground—are the focus of this Article. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly describes the 
Graham opinion and surveys what scholars to date have identified as 
salient aspects of the decision. Part II seeks to provide a blueprint for 
lower courts and legislatures implementing the Graham decision. 
Specifically, it argues that: (1) Graham is retroactively applicable to all 
inmates who received a life-without-parole sentence for a non-homicide 
juvenile crime; (2) those inmates entitled to relief under Graham require 
effective representation at their resentencing hearings so that their full 
life pictures can be presented; (3) judges presiding over resentencing 
hearings should err on the side of rehabilitation over retribution to 
comport with the spirit of Graham; and (4) long-term legislative and 
executive action are necessary to make Graham’s promise a reality. 
Finally, Part III suggests two broader lenses through which to view 
Graham. First, it suggests that Graham should be viewed as a symptom 
of our nation’s ongoing criminal justice failings. Second, it argues that, 
when read alongside the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Brown 
v. Plata,22 the Graham decision provides some hope for broader criminal 
justice reform. 
I. THE GRAHAM DECISION 
A. The Graham Opinion 
At the age of sixteen, Terrance J. Graham and three other adolescents 
                                                     
19. Id.  
20. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
21. See infra notes 191–196 and accompanying text (discussing juvenile vulnerability in adult 
prisons).  
22. 563 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
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attempted to rob a restaurant in Jacksonville, Florida.23 In the course of 
the attempted robbery, Graham’s accomplice struck the restaurant 
manager in the head twice with a metal bar.24 Graham was arrested for 
attempted robbery, and the prosecutor elected to charge him as an 
adult.25 Graham was charged with armed burglary with assault or battery 
and attempted armed robbery; he faced a maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.26 He pleaded guilty to 
both charges under a plea agreement that resulted in three years 
probation and required him to serve the first twelve months of his 
probation in county jail.27 Because of time Graham had served while 
awaiting trial, he was released six months after his sentence.28 Less than 
six months later, Graham was allegedly involved in another robbery, and 
his probation officer reported to the trial court that Graham had violated 
the conditions of his probation.29 Graham was a few weeks shy of 
eighteen when the probation violations were reported.30 
One year later, a different trial court judge presided over a trial 
regarding Graham’s alleged probation violations.31 Graham maintained 
that he had not been involved in the robbery, but he did admit to fleeing 
from police.32 The trial court found that Graham violated his probation 
by committing a home invasion robbery, possessing a firearm, and 
associating with persons engaged in criminal activity.33 Under Florida 
law, without a downward departure by the judge, Graham was eligible 
for a sentence ranging from five years to life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole.34 The State recommended that Graham receive 
thirty years on the armed burglary count and fifteen years on the 
attempted armed robbery count, while the Florida Department of 
Corrections recommended that Graham receive only a four-year 
                                                     
23. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018.  
24. Id. 
25. Id.; see also John D. Burrow, Punishing Serious Juvenile Offenders: A Case Study of 
Michigan’s Prosecutorial Waiver Statute, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 14–21 (2005) 
(discussing prosecutorial waiver generally and identifying criticisms of models like the one in 
Florida).  
26. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
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sentence.35 Instead, the trial court judge sentenced Graham to life 
imprisonment for the armed burglary and fifteen years for the attempted 
armed robbery.36 Because Florida abolished its parole system in 2003,37 
Graham’s life sentence meant that he had no possibility of release unless 
he was granted executive clemency.38 
The question presented to the U.S. Supreme Court in Graham’s case 
was whether a life-without-parole sentence was permissible for a non-
homicide juvenile offender.39 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy 
held that the Constitution categorically forbids such a sentence.40 First, 
he explained that the Eighth Amendment bars both “barbaric” 
punishments and punishments that are disproportionate to the crime 
committed.41 Within the latter category, the Court explained that its 
cases fell into one of two classifications: (1) cases challenging the length 
of term-of-years sentences given all the circumstances in a particular 
                                                     
35. Id.  
36. Id. at 2020. Despite the fact that the state offered no rehabilitative services to Graham during 
his probation, the sentencing judge apparently thought that his case was hopeless. See id. (“[I]n a 
very short period of time you were back before the Court on a violation of this probation, and then 
here you are two years later standing before me, literally the—facing a life sentence as to—up to 
life as to count 1 and up to 15 years as to count 2. And I don’t understand why you would be given 
such a great opportunity to do something with your life and why you would throw it away. The only 
thing that I can rationalize is that you decided that this is how you were going to lead your life and 
that there is nothing that we can do for you. And as the state pointed out, that this is an escalating 
pattern of criminal conduct on your part and that we can’t help you any further. We can’t do 
anything to deter you. This is the way you are going to lead your life, and I don’t know why you are 
going to. You’ve made that decision. I have no idea. But, evidently, that is what you decided to do. 
So then it becomes a focus, if I can’t do anything to help you, if I can’t do anything to get you back 
on the right path, then I have to start focusing on the community and trying to protect the 
community from your actions. And, unfortunately, that is where we are today is I don’t see where I 
can do anything to help you any further. You’ve evidently decided this is the direction you’re going 
to take in life, and it’s unfortunate that you made that choice. I have reviewed the statute. I don’t see 
where any further juvenile sanctions would be appropriate. I don’t see where any youthful offender 
sanctions would be appropriate. Given your escalating pattern of criminal conduct, it is apparent to 
the Court that you have decided that this is the way you are going to live your life and that the only 
thing I can do now is to try and protect the community from your actions.” (alteration in original) 
(quoting trial court)).  
37. FLA. STAT. § 921.002(1)(e) (2003).  
38. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2020. “Clemency” is a general term, and it may entail a pardon, 
reprieve, or the commutation of a sentence. See Mary-Beth Moylan & Linda E. Carter, Clemency in 
California Capital Cases, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 37, 39–40 (2009) (defining the term and its 
various forms). Executive clemency grants of any kind are incredibly rare, and as a result, Graham’s 
sentence was tantamount to a sentence to die in prison. See Michael Heise, Mercy by the Numbers: 
An Empirical Analysis of Clemency and Its Structure, 89 VA. L. REV. 239, 250–51 (2003) 
(discussing a downward trend in clemency grants from 1973 to 1999).  
39. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2017–18.  
40. Id. at 2034.  
41. Id. at 2021.  
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case and (2) cases where the Court has considered categorical 
restrictions on the death penalty.42 Because Graham’s case challenged “a 
particular type of sentence” and its application to “an entire class of 
offenders who have committed a range of crimes,”43 the Court found the 
categorical approach appropriate and relied upon its recent death penalty 
case law for guidance.44 
When the Court has taken a categorical approach to proportionality,45 
it looks to objective indicia of national consensus, beginning with 
relevant legislation.46 Justice Kennedy explained that while thirty-seven 
states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government permit life-
without-parole sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenders, the actual 
sentencing practices of these jurisdictions tell another story.47 Based on 
the evidence before it, the Court determined that, at the time of the 
decision, there were 123 non-homicide juvenile offenders serving a life-
without-parole sentence nationwide and seventy-seven of them were in 
Florida prisons.48 Given the “exceedingly rare” incidence of the 
punishment in question, the Court held that there was a national 
consensus against life-without-parole sentences for non-homicide 
juvenile offenders.49 
While the Court acknowledged that “community consensus”50 was 
“entitled to great weight,”51 it proceeded to render its own judgment 
regarding the constitutionality of Graham’s sentence.52 In this regard, the 
Court focused on two aspects of the case: first, the uniqueness of 
juvenile offenders—specifically their lessened culpability and their 
greater capacity for reformation53—and second, the historical treatment 
                                                     
42. Id.  
43. Id. at 2022–23.  
44. Id. at 2023; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Categorizing Graham, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 49, 49 
(2010) (“The Court [wrote] just four sentences to justify its use of the capital proportionality test in 
Graham’s case.”).  
45. See generally, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (banning death penalty for 
child rape); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (banning death penalty for juvenile offenders); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (banning death penalty for mentally retarded offenders).  
46. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023.  
47. Id.  
48. Id. at 2024.  
49. Id. at 2026.  
50. Id. 
51. Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 434 (2008)). 
52. Id. For a criticism of the U.S. Supreme Court’s assessment of evolving standards of decency, 
see John F. Stinneford, Evolving Away from Evolving Standards of Decency, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 
87 (2010).  
53. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.  
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of non-homicide crimes as less severe than crimes where a victim is 
killed.54 Looking at these two features, the Court reasoned: “It follows 
that, when compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did 
not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability.”55 At 
the same time, when the Court examined the various justifications for 
any criminal sanction, it determined that none could justify life without 
parole for defendants like Graham.56 Accordingly, the Court held: 
A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a 
juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. What the 
State must do, however, is give defendants like Graham some 
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation . . . . The Eighth Amendment does 
not foreclose the possibility that persons convicted of 
nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will remain 
behind bars for life. It does forbid States from making the 
judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to 
reenter society.57 
Chief Justice Roberts, concurring in the judgment,58 emphasized that 
the Court did not need to craft a categorical rule for all cases like 
Graham’s.59 Instead, under the Chief Justice’s approach, the Court could 
have relied upon its well-established “narrow proportionality” review 
historically applicable to non-capital cases.60 According to the Chief 
Justice, applying that precedent would have “provide[d] a sufficient 
framework for assessing the concerns outlined by the majority”61 and 
                                                     
54. Id. at 2027.  
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 2028–30.  
57. Id. at 2030.  
58. Id. at 2036–43 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Justice Stevens also wrote a concurring opinion, in 
which Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined. Id. at 2036 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Society 
changes. Knowledge accumulates. We learn, sometimes, from our mistakes.”). 
59. Id. at 2036 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); see also Barkow, supra note 44, at 51–52 (discussing 
the potential import of the Chief Justice’s concurring opinion for future proportionality review at the 
U.S. Supreme Court and among lower courts).  
60. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2039–41 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Historically, narrow 
proportionality review has required the reviewing courts to conduct an initial inquiry that compares 
the gravity of the offense with the harshness of the penalty. This initial inquiry is a deferential one. 
Only in rare cases where the reviewing court finds a sentence to be grossly disproportionate to the 
crime committed should the court then conduct both an intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional 
comparison with sentences imposed for the same crime. If these two comparisons confirm the 
court’s initial finding of gross disproportionality, only then should the reviewing court find the 
defendant’s sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 2037–38 (explaining the narrow 
proportionality review process).  
61. Id. at 2039.  
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avoided inventing “a new constitutional rule of dubious provenance.”62 
Justices Thomas and Alito each dissented. Justice Thomas’ dissent 
emphasized what he saw as the majority’s methodological flaws. First, 
he criticized the Court’s “eviscerat[ion]” of the “death is different” 
approach to Eighth Amendment proportionality review.63 This new 
approach, in Justice Thomas’ view, opened the door to unlimited judicial 
authority in the Eighth Amendment realm. According to Justice Thomas, 
if the Court has the authority to categorically exempt a certain class of 
offenders from the “second most severe penalty,”64 there is nothing to 
prevent the Court from also exempting additional classes of offenders 
“from the law’s third, fourth, fifth, or fiftieth most severe penalties as 
well.”65 
Second, Justice Thomas viewed the majority’s decision as raising 
serious separation of powers concerns: “The ultimate question in this 
case is not whether a life-without-parole sentence ‘fits’ the crime at issue 
here or the crimes of juvenile nonhomicide offenders more generally, 
but to whom the Constitution assigns that decision.”66 According to 
Justice Thomas, the Constitution assigned that decision to the voters and 
their elected officials.67 Because the Florida legislature authorized a 
sentence of life without parole for non-homicide offenses and because 
the trial judge in Graham’s case lawfully imposed that sentence, Justice 
Thomas saw no role for the U.S. Supreme Court to play in this case.68 
By tackling this question, Justice Thomas wrote that the Court “reached 
to ensure that its own sense of morality and retributive justice pre-empts 
that of the people and their representatives.”69 
Justice Alito joined in Justice Thomas’ dissent, but also raised a 
separate point that deserves attention. He stated, “Nothing in the Court’s 
opinion affects the imposition of a sentence to a term of years without 
the possibility of parole. Indeed, petitioner conceded at oral argument 
that a sentence of as much as 40 years without the possibility of parole 
‘probably’ would be constitutional.”70 
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court found life-without-parole sentences 
                                                     
62. Id. at 2036.  
63. Id. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
64. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting majority opinion). 
65. Id. (citations omitted).  




70. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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unconstitutional for juvenile non-homicide offenders and, with its 
decision, entitled Terrance Graham and those similarly situated to a new 
sentence. 
B. Early Graham Scholarship 
Scholars have already identified several long-term, downstream 
implications that may flow from the Court’s decision in Graham. For 
example, some scholars have seized upon Graham’s methodological 
import.71 As discussed earlier, the Graham Court departed from the 
Court’s traditional use of narrow proportionality review in its non-death 
penalty cases.72 Scholars have argued that this methodological shift may 
have significant impact upon the Court’s jurisprudence both within and 
outside of the capital context. 
Professors Carol and Jordan Steiker have noted that, by shifting the 
Court’s methodology away from capital-versus-noncapital challenges to 
individual-versus-categorical challenges, “the window that Graham 
appears to open relates to classes of noncapital offenders who can assert 
special grounds for avoiding especially harsh punishment.”73 Under the 
Court’s new approach, the authors suggest that Graham permits juvenile 
challenges to life imprisonment and to excessive term-of-years 
sentences.74 At the same time, Professors Steiker and Steiker describe 
critical ways in which Graham may shape future capital cases, including 
the way its methodology “bolster[s]” the “constitutional case against the 
death penalty” altogether.75 
                                                     
71. See generally, e.g., Barkow, supra note 44 (considering implications of the Graham decision 
in future Eighth Amendment challenges); Robert Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Redemption Song: 
Graham v. Florida and the Evolving Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 86 (2010) (describing Graham Court’s departure from prior Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence and implications); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Graham Lets the Sun Shine 
in: The Supreme Court Opens a Window Between Two Formerly Walled-off Approaches to Eighth 
Amendment Proportionality Challenges, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 79 (2010) (discussing implications of 
Graham decision for capital and noncapital Eighth Amendment challenges).  
72. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.  
73. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 71, at 81 (emphasis in original).  
74. Id. To date, though, many courts continue to read Graham narrowly. See, e.g., Saeliaw v. 
Allison, No. C 11–2716 RS (PR), 2011 WL 3516171, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2011) (rejecting 
juvenile non-homicide offender’s challenge to indeterminate life sentence after Graham); Angel v. 
Commonwealth, 704 S.E.2d 386, 401–02 (Va. 2011) (upholding life sentence for non-homicide 
juvenile crime because state statute provided for conditional release upon a certain age); State v. 
Ninham, 797 N.W.2d 451, 465–74 (Wis. 2011) (upholding life without parole for fourteen-year-old 
homicide offender after Graham).  
75. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 71, at 84 (“[I]f death sentencing rates and execution rates 
continue to fall, or even remain stable at the current low levels, one can make a plausible claim that 
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Others have suggested that the Graham Court’s “constitutional 
mathematics” of borrowing from two separate lines of analysis—age- 
and homicide-based limitations on the death penalty—has potentially 
broad implications for future cases.76 For example, in the same way that 
the Graham Court described juvenile non-homicide offenders as having 
“twice diminished moral culpability,”77 “it would appear that a claim 
exists that a sentence of [life without parole] would also be 
unconstitutional for a mentally retarded defendant who did not kill or 
participate in a homicide.”78 Professor William Berry has argued that life 
without parole is different from all other forms of punishment and that, 
after Graham, the Court should consider establishing a separate category 
of Eighth Amendment review.79 Only two years after the Graham 
decision, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether 
fourteen-year-old children who were convicted of homicide may be 
sentenced to life in prison without parole after Graham.80 Thus, scholars 
have correctly noted the vast implications of the Court’s methodology in 
Graham. 
Legal scholars have also identified the “youth is different”81 aspect of 
the Graham Court’s decision. The Graham Court borrowed heavily 
from its decision in Roper v. Simmons,82 which banned the death penalty 
for juveniles, and emphasized the psychological immaturity of juveniles 
and their unique capacity for rehabilitation.83 Scholars have argued that 
the Graham Court’s emphasis upon juvenile psychology and 
neurological development may lay the foundation for future limitations 
on juvenile sentencing practices. For example, one scholar posits that 
                                                     
the legislative authorization of capital punishment is undercut by its small and very sporadic use, in 
much the same way that Graham found that the widespread legislative authorization of [life without 
parole] for juvenile nonhomicide offenders . . . was undercut by its relatively small actual use 
relative to its formally authorized use.”).  
76. Smith & Cohen, supra note 71, at 91.  
77. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010).  
78. Smith & Cohen, supra note 71, at 91. But see United States v. Moore, 643 F.3d 451, 456–57 
(6th Cir. 2011) (distinguishing the Eighth Amendment challenge of a mentally retarded adult from 
that presented by Graham). 
79. See generally William W. Berry III, More Different from Life, Less Different than Death, 71 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1109 (2010).  
80. Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, __S.W.3d__ (2011), cert. granted sub nom. Jackson v. 
Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2011) (No. 10-09647); see also Adam Liptak, Justices Will 
Hear 2 Cases of Life Sentences for Youths, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2011, at A13.  
81. See generally Stephen St. Vincent, Commentary: Kids Are Different, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 9 (2010).  
82. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  
83. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026–30 (2010).  
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increased knowledge about juvenile psychology will suggest more 
appropriate punishments and treatments for juveniles.84 Such knowledge 
“may lead to our societal standards of decency evolving more quickly 
towards less harsh sentences for juveniles than for adults, especially if 
there is no corresponding evidence that adult offenders would benefit 
from the same types of punishment as juveniles.”85 Another scholar has 
argued that Graham’s reasoning—seen in the context of the Court’s 
precedents—suggests that juveniles are not eligible for any kind of 
retributive punishment.86 Other scholars have argued that the Graham 
decision is only one example of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent child-
specific jurisprudence.87 With these recent arguments, scholars have 
begun to articulate how the Graham Court’s emphasis upon the unique 
aspects of juveniles may shape future cases. 
Finally, many scholars have used Graham as an opportunity to re-
examine the validity of life-without-parole sentencing nationwide. One 
scholar has argued that life-without-parole sentencing abandons 
altogether the notion of personal reformation—a notion that has 
historically driven American sentencing policy—and that moving away 
from the sentencing practice makes sense for individual inmates and 
taxpayers alike.88 Another scholar has made the case that executive 
actors should revive their use of clemency as an antidote to the life-
without-parole sentencing trend.89 As this scholarship indicates, 
Graham’s long-term implications may be both significant and far-
reaching. 
                                                     
84. St. Vincent, supra note 81, at 13. 
85. Id.  
86. Dan Markel, May Minors Be Retributively Punished After Panetti (and Graham)?, 23 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 62, 65 (2010) (arguing that in light of recent U.S. Supreme Court cases, “juveniles 
must be treated somewhat like the incompetent: that is, as sources of risk and objects of compassion 
who can hopefully be cured or treated or contained until they exhibit the competence expected from 
them as adults. Until that time . . . they should be spared the special sting of condemnation 
associated with the retributive rebuke commonly connected to punishments in prisons or trials as 
adults”). 
87. See, e.g., Tamar R. Birckhead, Graham v. Florida: Justice Kennedy’s Vision of Childhood and 
the Role of Judges, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 66 (2010) (noting Justice Kennedy’s 
consistent theme of youths as works in progress in areas such as the Establishment Clause, criminal 
sentencing, and due process); Deana Pollard Sacks, Children’s Developmental Vulnerability & the 
Roberts Court’s Child-Protective Jurisprudence: An Emerging Trend?, 40 STETSON L. REV. 777 
(2011) (noting the Court’s recent concern for the vulnerability of children in media and criminal 
sentencing cases). 
88. Ashley Nellis, Throwing Away the Key: The Expansion of Life Without Parole Sentences in 
the United States, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 27 (2010).  
89. Molly M. Gill, Clemency for Lifers: The Only Road Out Is the Road Not Taken, 23 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 21 (2010). 
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What has yet to be—and needs to be—examined are the vexing legal 
issues before judges and legislators today. The next Part of this Article 
addresses those issues. 
II. IMPLEMENTING GRAHAM ON THE GROUND 
This Part addresses several urgent collateral issues that flow from the 
Graham decision—all of which judges and lawmakers are addressing 
today. Specifically, it argues that: (1) Graham is retroactively applicable 
to all inmates who received a life-without-parole sentence for a non-
homicide juvenile crime; (2) those inmates entitled to relief under 
Graham require effective representation at their resentencing hearings; 
(3) judges presiding over resentencing hearings in the wake of Graham 
should err on the side of rehabilitation over retribution to comport with 
the spirit of Graham; and (4) long-term legislative and executive action 
are necessary in order to make Graham’s promise a reality. 
A. Graham Applies Retroactively 
In the last year, lower courts have disagreed over whether Graham 
applies retroactively.90 Perhaps this disagreement should not be 
surprising, as scholars historically have criticized the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s opaque retroactivity doctrine.91 Nonetheless, the Court’s most 
                                                     
90. Compare Bell v. Haws, No. CV09-3346-JFW (MLG), 2010 WL 3447218, at *9 n.6 (C.D. 
Cal. July 14, 2010) (“The Court notes that application of Graham to Petitioner’s case is permitted 
by the first exception to the Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), 
non-retroactivity doctrine because it announced a new rule that ‘prohibit[s] a certain category of 
punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.’ . . . Here, the Graham Court 
announced a new rule that prohibits a category of punishment—life without parole sentences—for 
juveniles based on their status and the type of offense, and the rule is thus retroactive on collateral 
review.” (citations omitted)), and Bonilla v. State, 791 N.W.2d 697, 700–01 (Iowa 2010) (“Graham 
applies retroactively to Bonilla because it is a new rule of substantive law clarifying the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.”), with Lawson v. Pennsylvania, No. 
Civ.A. 09-2120, 2010 WL 5300531, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2010) (“[T]here is no indication that 
the Supreme Court has held Graham retroactively applicable on collateral review . . . .”), and Jensen 
v. Zavaras, Civil Action No. 08-cv-01670-RPM, 2010 WL 2825666, at *1–2 (D. Colo. July 16, 
2010) (“Given the Court’s recognition of the many state statutes that permit life without parole for 
juvenile non-homicide offenders shown in the appendix to the opinion and the premise that 
Graham’s sentence was contrary to the majority’s view of ‘evolving standards of decency’ it is 
inconceivable that this new rule will be applied retroactively to invalidate sentences imposed in 
those states.”).  
91. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 100 n.310 
(2004) (“[T]he present jurisprudence of retroactivity is widely thought to be unnecessarily confused 
and confusing.” (citations omitted)); Christopher Strauss, Collateral Damage: How the Supreme 
Court’s Retroactivity Doctrine Affects Federal Drug Prisoners’ Apprendi Claims on Collateral 
Review, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1220, 1222 (2003) (“Over the course of the past thirty-six years, the Court 
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recent relevant case law makes clear that a new substantive rule, like the 
one announced in Graham, does apply retroactively.92 Accordingly, a 
juvenile non-homicide offender serving a life-without-parole sentence is 
entitled to challenge that sentence under Graham, regardless of the 
procedural posture of the offender’s case.93 This sub-part explains 
retroactivity in general and its application to the Graham decision. 
The question of who benefits from a new constitutional rule hinges on 
both the nature of the rule and the posture of the individual’s case. When 
the U.S. Supreme Court announces a new constitutional rule, that rule is 
applicable to all criminal cases still pending on direct review.94 This is 
because the Court, unlike a legislative body, decides only one case at a 
time, and each case must serve as “the vehicle for announcement of a 
new rule.”95 The Court has long recognized that similarly situated 
individuals whose cases are pending on direct review fall within the 
purview of a new rule.96 
Whether a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure applies 
retroactively to cases pending on collateral review is more complex. In 
Teague v. Lane,97 the Court embraced a position previously advocated 
by Justice Harlan and held that, in general, new constitutional rules of 
criminal procedure are not applicable to cases on collateral review.98 
Under this so-called “non-retroactivity doctrine,” a defendant whose 
case is at the habeas corpus stage may only invoke a new rule in one of 
two situations.99 First, the defendant may raise a claim based on the new 
rule if the rule itself “places a class of private conduct beyond the power 
                                                     
has grappled with the issue of retroactivity and has crafted a theoretically incoherent doctrine that 
has proven difficult to apply.”); see also Strauss, supra, at 1227–39 (describing the Court’s 
retroactivity doctrine). 
92. See infra note 108 (discussing the retroactive application of Atkins and Roper). 
93. It may very well be the case that the logic of Graham has an even wider application than I 
argue herein. For example, lawyers may prevail before the U.S. Supreme Court in arguing that 
Graham also precludes a life-without-parole sentence for some juvenile homicide offenders. See EJI 
Challenges Death-in-Prison Sentences for Young Teens in Two Cases at U.S. Supreme Court, 
EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.eji.org/eji/node/524. In this sub-part, I am 
focused on those inmates who are legally entitled to a resentencing hearing immediately as a result 
of Graham, rather than future extensions of Graham.  
94. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322–23 (1987); see also Davis v. United States, 564 
U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2430 (2011) (stating the rule from Griffith).  
95. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322.  
96. Id. at 323.  
97. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
98. Id. at 310.  
99. Id. at 311; Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 537 & n.22 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining the two 
exceptions).  
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of the State to proscribe” or prohibits a certain kind of punishment for a 
certain kind of offender.100 Second, a defendant may argue for the new 
rule to be retroactively applied if the new rule qualifies as a “watershed” 
rule of criminal procedure and thus calls into question the “fundamental 
fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”101 More recently, the 
Court has shifted its terminology somewhat102 and has described new 
rules as “substantive” when they “alter[] the range of conduct or the 
class of persons that the law punishes,” rather than describing them as 
falling within the first of the two non-retroactivity exceptions.103 
Generally, new substantive “rules apply retroactively because they 
‘necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of 
an act that the law does not make criminal’ or faces a punishment that 
the law cannot impose upon him.”104 
Applying this doctrine to Graham, it is evident that all juvenile non-
homicide offenders serving a life-without-parole sentence may challenge 
that sentence under Graham. Because all new rules are applicable to 
cases pending on direct review,105 those offenders whose cases are at the 
direct review stage should not even need to address the retroactivity 
question. Those inmates whose cases are on collateral review are also 
entitled to challenge their sentence under Graham, as even the narrowest 
reading of Graham renders a certain type of punishment—life without 
parole—unconstitutional for a certain class of persons—non-homicide 
juvenile offenders.106 Courts that have held otherwise have overlooked 
the distinction between new substantive and procedural rules.107 New 
substantive rules, like the one in Graham, are retroactively applicable 
even to cases pending on collateral review.108 
                                                     
100. Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 271 n.5 (2002) (citing Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 494 
(1990)). 
101. Id. (citations omitted). 
102. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 n.4 (2004). 
103. Id. at 353. 
104. Id. at 352 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)).  
105. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
106. In re Sparks, 657 F.3d 258, 262 (2011) (holding that Graham applies retroactively on 
collateral review as matter of logical necessity).  
107. See, e.g., supra note 90. 
108. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). In Atkins, the U.S. Supreme Court barred a 
certain type of punishment—the death penalty—for a certain class of offenders—the mentally 
retarded. Id. at 321. Lower courts have recognized that this rule applies retroactively to cases 
pending on collateral review, even though the U.S. Supreme Court did not expressly say so in 
Atkins. See In re Holladay, 331 F.3d 1169, 1172–73 (11th Cir. 2003). Instead, the rule applied 
retroactively “by logical necessity.” Id. at 1172 (citation omitted). That is, the U.S. Supreme Court 
had already identified what class of rules are retroactively applicable, namely those that are 
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Even non-homicide juvenile offenders serving a life-without-parole 
sentence who have already filed a federal habeas corpus petition should 
be eligible to seek relief under Graham. The federal habeas corpus 
statute bars second or successive petitions, but the statute itself does not 
define what constitutes a successive petition.109 Federal courts have 
determined that a habeas corpus petition is successive—and thus barred 
except under very limited circumstances—“when it: (1) raises a claim 
challenging the petitioner’s conviction or sentence that was or could 
have been raised in an earlier petition; or (2) otherwise constitutes an 
abuse of the writ.”110 Because Graham announced a new substantive rule 
that renders a certain kind of sentence unconstitutional for an entire class 
of defendants, the decision allows inmates to challenge their sentence in 
a way they could not have in an earlier petition. Accordingly, because a 
petition based on the Graham rule should not be barred as a “successive” 
petition, the Graham rule may serve as the basis for relief even for those 
inmates who have already filed a federal habeas corpus petition.111 Thus, 
Graham applies to inmates nationwide who were sentenced to life 
without parole for a juvenile non-homicide offense, regardless of the 
procedural posture of those cases. 
It is also worth noting that the application of Graham may reach even 
further than the Court realized at the time of its decision. In particular, 
the Graham Court relied heavily on one report—the Annino Report—to 
calculate the number of inmates nationwide serving a life-without-parole 
sentence for a juvenile non-homicide offense.112 The Annino Report 
                                                     
substantive in nature and preclude a kind of punishment for a class of offenders; the Court 
announced such a rule in Atkins. Id.; see also In re Morris, 328 F.3d 739, 740 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(holding Atkins retroactively applicable). Courts also held Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), 
in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment barred execution for juveniles, to 
be retroactively applicable for similar reasons. See Holly v. State, No. 3:98CV53-D-A, 2006 WL 
763133 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 24, 2006); Wimberly v. State, 934 So. 2d 411, 416 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) 
(“The Roper v. Simmons decision also applies retroactively to cases on collateral review because it 
places ‘certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-
making authority to proscribe.’” (quoting Duncan v. State, 925 So. 2d 245, 251 (Ala. Crim. App. 
2005)).  
109. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2006); see also In re Cain, 137 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 
1998) (noting that the statute does not define “successive”).  
110. In re Cain, 137 F.3d at 235 (collecting cases on this point).  
111. In re Sparks, 657 F.3d 258, 260–62 (5th Cir. 2011) (granting inmate’s motion to file 
successive habeas petition on the basis of Graham’s retroactive application); cf. In re Brown, 457 
F.3d 392, 396 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that successive petition is not barred based on the Court’s 
new rule that it is unconstitutional to use the death penalty against the mentally retarded).  
112. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010) (citing Paolo G. Annino et al., 
Juvenile Life Without Parole for Non-Homicide Offenses: Florida Compared to Nation, FLA. ST. U. 
C.L. 2 (Sept. 14, 2009), 
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estimated that there were 109 juvenile non-homicide offenders serving a 
life-without-parole sentence nationwide, seventy-seven of whom were in 
Florida.113 In order to arrive at this number, the Annino Report defined a 
“non-homicide” crime as “any criminal conviction where the juvenile is 
not convicted of any type or degree of homicide.”114 In other words, 
according to the Annino Report, a defendant convicted of attempted 
homicide or felony murder counted as a homicide offender.115 
While the Court relied heavily upon the Annino Report to document 
the incidence of juvenile life-without-parole sentences for non-homicide 
offenders, it is not clear whether the Court accepted the report’s 
definition of a non-homicide offense. The Court explained that 
defendants like Terrance Graham are less culpable than others, in part, 
because their crimes did not result in the death of another human 
being.116 However, the same argument could apply to a defendant 
convicted of attempted homicide, and yet the Annino Report treated 
attempted homicide as a homicide offense. Moreover, citing felony 
murder precedents, the Court stated that those “defendants who do not 
kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken,” are less culpable 
than murderers.117 This suggests that the Court may view a defendant 
who was convicted of felony murder as a non-homicide offender, even 
though the Annino Report did not. A Florida appellate court recently 
applied a broader definition of non-homicide than that used in the 
Annino Report and held that Graham applies to all cases where the 
juvenile was convicted of a crime that did not result in the death of the 
victim.118 The U.S. Supreme Court denied Florida’s petition for 
certiorari challenging this interpretation on October 11, 2011.119 
                                                     
http://www.law.fsu.edu/faculty/profiles/annino/Report_juvenile_lwop_092009.pdf [hereinafter 
Annino Report]).  
113. Annino Report, supra note 112, at 2.  
114. Id. at 3–4.  
115. Id. at 4.  
116. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027 (“Serious nonhomicide crimes ‘may be devastating in their 
harm . . . but in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, . . . they 
cannot be compared to murder in their severity and irrevocability.’” (omissions in original) (quoting 
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 410 (2008)).  
117. Id.  
118. Manuel v. State, 48 So. 3d 94, 96–97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that Graham 
applied to non-homicide offenders and that attempted murder with firearm was not a homicide 
offense). But cf. Cox v. State, 2011 Ark. 96, 2011 WL 737307, at *2 (2011) (holding that Graham 
permits imposition of life-without-parole sentence in case where defendant was convicted as 
accomplice to homicide).  
119. See Florida v. Manuel, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 446 (2011) (mem.), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/101111zor.pdf; see also U.S. Supreme Court 
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In light of this analysis, it is simply not true that Graham was a 
“narrow” case “which did nothing more than entitle a small group of 
offenders to the mere possibility of eventual parole.”120 Rather, the 
Graham decision applies retroactively to all juvenile offenders serving a 
life-without-parole sentence whose crime did not result in the death of 
the victim. The full extent of Graham’s application is still emerging as 
lawyers working to implement Graham continue to identify inmates who 
fall within its purview.121 
B. Graham Requires the States to Provide Effective Representation at 
Resentencing Hearings 
Having defined the pool of inmates to whom Graham applies 
(“Graham inmates”), the next question becomes: what are these inmates 
entitled to under Graham? Graham requires that the states provide each 
Graham inmate with a resentencing hearing, as well as effective 
representation in preparation for and at that resentencing hearing. The 
resentencing hearing cannot be a pro forma protocol; rather, it must 
afford the defendant and the defendant’s counsel the opportunity to 
present the inmate’s full life picture—before and during incarceration. 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel 
for his defence.”122 The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted this right to 
apply to “all critical stages of a criminal prosecution,”123 and sentencing 
                                                     
Upholds Decision Barring Life Without Parole for Kids Convicted of Attempted Murder, EQUAL 
JUST. INITIATIVE (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.eji.org/eji/node/571. 
120. Richard M. Re, Can Congress Overturn Graham v. Florida?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
367, 375 (2011).  
121. For example, lawyers in Florida are also seeking the application of the Graham rule to 
felony murder defendants, again, despite the fact that the Annino Report did not include felony 
murder defendants. Telephone Interview with Ilona Vila, Dir., Juv. Life Without Parole Def. Res. 
Ctr., Barry Univ. Sch. of Law (Oct. 4, 2011, 12:00 PM).  
122. U.S CONST. amend. VI.  
123. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S.__, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2085 (2009); see also Kansas v. Ventris, 
556 U.S.__, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1844–45 (2009) (affirming that right to counsel extends to various 
pretrial stages where defendant confronts agents of state); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 
(1985) (“[W]hatever else it may mean, the right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that 
judicial proceedings have been initiated against him . . . . This is because, after the initiation of 
adversary criminal proceedings, the government has committed itself to prosecute, and . . . the 
adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds 
himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of 
substantive and procedural criminal law.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
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is a critical stage for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.124 Not only does 
the defendant have a general interest in the “character”125 of the 
sentencing proceeding, but also defense counsel can take several 
measures throughout the sentencing process to safeguard the defendant’s 
rights. Defense counsel may advise the defendant regarding the 
government’s range of potentially applicable sentences and pre-sentence 
investigations;126 inform the defendant of certain rights that may be lost 
if not exercised at the sentencing stage;127 and present relevant 
mitigating evidence.128 For these reasons, the right to counsel at 
sentencing is almost as well-established as the right to counsel itself.129 
When an existing sentence is modified or corrected, the defendant’s 
presence, let alone defense counsel’s, may not be required.130 In contrast, 
when “an original sentencing package is vacated in its entirety on appeal 
and the case is remanded for resentencing,”131 the defendant has a 
constitutional right to be present132 and to be represented by counsel.133 
This distinction is appropriate. When a trial court merely corrects a 
sentencing error and adjusts the sentence to make it less onerous for the 
defendant, there is no evidentiary hearing; the sentencing judge’s task is 
purely ministerial.134 Accordingly, neither the defendant nor defense 
                                                     
124. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 130–37 
(1967).  
125. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358.  
126. United States v. Washington, 619 F.3d 1252, 1260 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[K]nowledge about the 
structure and mechanics of the sentencing guidelines and the sentencing process will often be 
crucial to advising a defendant about how to conduct himself through the sentencing process.”).  
127. Mempa, 389 U.S. at 135–36.  
128. Hall v. Washington, 106 F.3d 742, 749–50 (7th Cir. 1997) (describing counsel’s role in 
developing and presenting mitigation evidence at sentencing).  
129. Compare Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–45 (1963) (holding the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel applicable to state criminal proceedings), with Mempa, 389 U.S. at 
134–37 (extending Gideon to the sentencing stage only four years later). 
130. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1497 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that 
defendant had no right to be present nor to have counsel when court’s action was “a remedial 
reduction of sentence after a successful [statutory] challenge to the legality of the original 
sentence”).  
131. Id. at 1496.  
132. United States v. Moree, 928 F.2d 654, 655–56 (5th Cir. 1991).  
133. Hall v. Moore, 253 F.3d 624, 627–28 (11th Cir. 2001); Johnson v. United States, 619 F.2d 
366, 369 (5th Cir. 1980); People v. McDermott, 906 N.Y.S.2d 415, 415–16 (2010) (remanding for 
second resentencing because defendant was not adequately advised regarding his right to counsel at 
resentencing). But see Morris v. Buss, 776 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1306 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (noting that 
while federal appellate courts have recognized the right to counsel at resentencing, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has not explicitly extended the right to counsel at sentencing to include 
resentencing).  
134. Dougherty v. State, 785 So. 2d 1221, 1223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).  
06 - WLR March 2012 Drinan Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/15/2012  12:08 PM 
2012] GRAHAM ON THE GROUND 71 
 
counsel needs to be present in order to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.135 
In contrast, when a true resentencing takes place, the judge exercises 
discretion, just as the initial sentencing judge did, and so the defendant’s 
right to be present and to have counsel is constitutionally mandated.136 
The Graham inmates are entitled to a resentencing hearing at which 
the right to counsel attaches. Contrary to cases where the state court 
judge will perform a purely ministerial task to the advantage of the 
defendant, in the wake of Graham, state court judges presiding over 
resentencing hearings will exercise great discretion.137 Precisely because 
the Graham Court did not delineate the scope of a permissible term-of-
years sentence, defendants will need to argue for a specific sentence and 
demonstrate why it is appropriate. In order to do so, the defendant will 
need the assistance of counsel and perhaps other experts.138 Defense 
counsel will need to present the defendant’s social history prior to the 
initial sentence, behavioral record during incarceration, and prospects for 
rehabilitation.139 This is especially true in light of the Graham Court’s 
emphasis on the unique ability for juvenile rehabilitation and 
maturation.140 After several years—if not decades—in prison, some of 
these inmates may have demonstrated substantial growth and 
maturity.141 The sentence they receive in a resentencing hearing should 
                                                     
135. See, e.g., United States v. Nolley, 27 F.3d 80, 81–82 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that where trial 
court has no role but to implement corrected sentence from appellate court there is no function for 
defendant or defense counsel); United States v. Brewer, No. 09-12945, 2010 WL 22847 (11th Cir. 
Jan. 6, 2010) (affirming modification of sentence entered without defendant present).  
136. United States v. Behrens, 375 U.S. 162, 167–68 (1963).  
137. State v. Casiano, 922 A.2d 1065, 1068–69 (Conn. 2007) (holding that state law entitles 
indigent defendant to representation when seeking to correct sentence); Acosta v. State, 46 So. 3d 
1179, 1180–81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding it was reversible error where trial judge exercised 
discretion at resentencing and neither defendant nor counsel was present); State v. Littleton, 982 So. 
2d 978, 980 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (distinguishing ministerial from discretionary act of judge).  
138. Lawyers representing the Graham inmates at resentencing have said that they are treating 
these resentencing hearings like capital mitigation hearings. Kinnally, supra note 5. If so, then they 
will likely need to draw on the expertise of several outside consultants. See generally Am. Bar 
Ass’n, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty 
Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 952–60 (2003) (describing the “team” approach and the necessity 
of mental health and mitigation expertise for capital cases).  
139. Kinnally, supra note 5.  
140. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026–30 (2010).  
141. Scholars have debated whether and how prison sentence length and recidivism are 
correlated. See, e.g., Lin Song & Roxanne Lieb, Recidivism: The Effect of Incarceration and Length 
of Time Served, WASH. ST. INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y (Sept. 1993), 
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/IncarcRecid.pdf (looking at studies showing both positive and 
negative correlation). Recent work indicates that there is a positive correlation between sentence 
length and recidivism. See, e.g., David S. Abrams, Building Criminal Capital v. Specific 
Deterrence: The Effect of Incarceration Length on Recidivism, NW. U. L. SCH. (Oct. 25, 2010), 
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reflect that development and their potential for further rehabilitation. 
Accordingly, the Graham inmates are entitled to a resentencing hearing 
at which they are present and during which they have effective 
representation. 
C. Judges Sentencing Juveniles After Graham Should Err in Favor of 
Rehabilitation over Retribution 
The Graham Court determined that the Eighth Amendment precludes 
the states from imposing life-without-parole sentences on non-homicide 
juvenile offenders, but the Court declined to set an upper limit on what 
sentence such offenders could receive.142 Since the Graham decision, 
lower court judges have grappled with that question and have come to 
widely divergent conclusions.143 The Graham Court’s rationale 
precludes excessive term-of-years sentences, for they, too, deprive the 
juvenile offender of “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release 
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”144 Judges sentencing 
juveniles after Graham should err on the side of rehabilitation over 
retribution. 
The Supremacy Clause requires state judges to defer to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal constitutional questions.145 
                                                     
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/colloquium/law_economics/documents/AbramsRecidivism10251
0.pdf (finding a specific deterrent effect for sentencing, but one that diminishes as sentences get 
longer); Valerie Wright, Deterrence in Criminal Justice: Evaluating Certainty v. Severity of 
Punishment, SENT’G PROJECT 6–8 (Nov. 2010), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/Deterrence%20Briefing%20.pdf (discussing studies showing 
positive correlation between sentence and recidivism rate). To the extent that prison conditions—
and the experience of them over longer periods of time—contribute to an increased recidivism rate, 
I argue in Part II.D that juvenile conditions of confinement must affirmatively seek to promote 
rehabilitation.  
142. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in the Court’s opinion affects 
the imposition of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility of parole.”). 
143. Compare People v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920, 924–27 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (holding 
that sentence of 110 years to life for juvenile non-homicide offender was not precluded by 
Graham), petition for review granted, 250 P.3d 179, with People v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 
881–83 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that eighty-four-year sentence for juvenile carjacker was 
precluded by Graham because sentence that exceeds life expectancy is tantamount to life without 
parole).  
144. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.  
145. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”).  
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Moreover, “[l]aw is not an exercise in mathematical logic,”146 and a 
holding from the U.S. Supreme Court must be understood in its 
appropriate context. Justice Kennedy’s opinion reflects an acceptance 
that juveniles are both less morally culpable and more amenable to 
rehabilitation than adults.147 According to the majority’s rationale, the 
very nature of juveniles makes the life-without-parole sentence 
impermissible outside the homicide context. Judges who impose 
excessive term-of-years sentences in the wake of Graham engage in a 
hollow and hyper-technical reading of the Court’s decision. Moreover, 
judges who do so eviscerate one of the most central themes of the 
opinion: hope and its importance for the incarcerated juvenile.148 Lower 
court judges imposing sentences in the wake of Graham should heed the 
Court’s language regarding the nature of juveniles and impose sentences 
that enable possible rehabilitation and release. 
The Court had at its disposal numerous arguments regarding the 
unconstitutionality of Graham’s life-without-parole sentence,149 yet it 
focused its opinion upon the finality and excessiveness of his 
sentence.150 In an amicus brief, The Sentencing Project argued that 
Graham’s life-without-parole sentence was unconstitutional because it 
was imposed in the absence of jury or judicial discretion.151 The 
Sentencing Project explained: 
[J]uvenile offenders are frequently subject to mandatory transfer 
and mandatory sentencing statutes, whose use has exploded 
during the past two decades. The combined effect of these laws 
often dooms juvenile offenders. At the outset, they require many 
juveniles to be tried as adults. Then, upon conviction in the adult 
system, they mandate life-without-parole sentences for certain 
crimes. Together, these laws deny juveniles any opportunity to 
have their age and diminished culpability considered by any 
decision-maker at any stage of the proceedings against them.152 
Despite the merit of this argument, Justice Kennedy’s opinion does 
                                                     
146. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 831 (2007) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).  
147. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029–30. 
148. See generally Smith & Cohen, supra note 71.  
149. Fourteen amicus briefs were filed with the Court in support of Petitioner Terrance Graham’s 
Eighth Amendment challenge. See Graham v. Florida, SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/graham-v-florida/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2011).  
150. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.  
151. See Brief for The Sentencing Project as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14–22, 
Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (Nos. 08-7412 & 08-7621).  
152. Id. at 15–16.  
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not indicate that the Court’s primary concern was a widespread lack of 
sentencing discretion. If it were the Court’s main concern, one could 
credibly argue that an excessive term-of-years sentence—even an 80- or 
100-year sentence—in the wake of Graham was permissible, as long as 
it was the product of independent judicial discretion. Instead, the 
majority opinion focused on the unique characteristics of juvenile 
offenders, relying on the same brain science that motivated its decision 
to ban the death penalty for juveniles.153 In addition, Justice Kennedy 
defended the Court’s categorical rule in part by asserting the dangers of 
unchecked judicial discretion at the sentencing stage.154 For example, the 
sentencing judge in Graham’s case imposed life without parole despite 
significantly lower recommendations from the state, because the judge 
“concluded that Graham was incorrigible.”155 When judges who hand 
down excessive juvenile sentences argue, for example, that it is “cruel 
and unusual punishment for the victims to have endured the rage, the 
brutality, the terror that [the defendant] exacted upon them,”156 they act 
precisely as Justice Kennedy feared: they allow the brutality of the crime 
to overshadow the immaturity and potential for growth in the juvenile 
defendant.157 
Thus, Justice Kennedy’s opinion indicates that the constitutional 
infirmity of Graham’s sentence was its finality and excessiveness in light 
of his youth. The sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because it 
“guarantee[d] he [would] die in prison without any meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release, no matter what he might do to demonstrate 
that the bad acts he committed as a teenager are not representative of his 
true character . . . .”158 Accordingly, lower courts sentencing juveniles in 
the wake of Graham should avoid excessive sentences that foreclose the 
possibility of parole review after a reasonable period of time.159 
                                                     
153. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27.  
154. Id. at 2031 (“Nothing in Florida’s laws prevents its courts from sentencing a juvenile 
nonhomicide offender to life without parole based on a subjective judgment that the defendant’s 
crimes demonstrate an ‘irretrievably depraved character.’ This is inconsistent with the Eighth 
Amendment.” (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005)).  
155. Id. (citation omitted).  
156. Kunerth, ‘Lifers’ Sentenced as Teens Get 2nd Chance, supra note 8 (quoting Florida Circuit 
Judge).  
157. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2031.  
158. Id. at 2033.  
159. If judges continue to impose sentences that are tantamount to life without parole, the U.S. 
Supreme Court will most likely recognize an anemic reading of Graham as unconstitutional in due 
course. For example, in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), the Court considered the question 
of whether a documented police technique of questioning a suspect first and then providing a 
Miranda warning was permissible in light of the Court’s Miranda case law. Id at 604. The Court 
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Finally, judges sentencing juveniles in the wake of Graham should err 
in favor of potential release in order to promote finality and to protect 
scarce judicial resources. In the handful of cases to date where judges 
have imposed excessive sentences in the wake of Graham, defense 
counsel has indicated, of course, that they will appeal the decisions.160 
These appeals not only deprive the defendant and the victim of finality 
regarding the sentencing decision, but also they are costly and time-
consuming for courts to review.161 Such time and cost cannot be justified 
when a sentencing judge can impose an alternate sentence that both 
serves the state’s penological goal and comports with Graham. 
D. Legislative and Executive Action Are Needed to Make Graham’s 
Promise a Reality 
In the long term, state lawmakers and executive actors need to take 
bold steps in order for Graham’s promise to become a reality. Two 
specific issues require immediate attention from legislators and 
executive actors: (1) parole policy and (2) conditions of confinement for 
juvenile offenders. 
1. Parole Policy 
There is no federal constitutional provision that requires the states to 
provide inmates with parole.162 In the early twentieth century, though, 
most states recognized the need for corrections policy to address 
rehabilitation and reentry into society.163 As a result, at that time, most 
                                                     
roundly rejected the protocol as a “police strategy adapted to undermine the Miranda warnings,” 
and it held this “end run” around the Court’s Miranda decision unconstitutional. Id. at 616. 
Similarly, if state court judges persist in imposing sentences in the wake of Graham as excessive as 
70, 80, or 100 years, eventually the Court will recognize such sentences as an evisceration of its 
decision in Graham and an end run around it analysis.  
160. See, e.g., Kris Wernowsky, Teen Rapist Sentenced to 80 Years, PENSACOLA NEWS J. (Jan. 
28, 2011) (on file with Washington Law Review) (describing resentencing of Graham inmate and 
counsel’s plan to appeal the eighty year resentencing).  
161. It is difficult to identify precisely the costs of an appeal, but mainstream press accounts of 
criminal cases demonstrate that, at every stage, our criminal justice system is expensive. See, e.g., 
Evelyn Larrubia & Stephanie Stassel, The Cost of Justice, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1998, at B2, 
available at http://articles.latimes.com/1998/sep/13/local/me-22481 (cataloging notorious criminal 
trials in L.A. County, some of which cost ten million dollars or more); Trish Hartman, The High 
Cost of Trials, WNEP (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.wnep.com/news/countybycounty/wnep-cost-
trial-lackawanna-schuylkill,0,7928109.story (describing trial that may cost taxpayers $100,000 
exclusive of public defender expenses and additional courthouse security).  
162. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980) (“There is no constitutional or inherent right to 
parole.” (citation omitted)).  
163. The Future of Parole as a Key Partner in Assuring Public Safety, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE NAT’L 
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states introduced the possibility of parole, typically at the discretion of a 
parole board.164 In the late twentieth century, amid predictions of 
increasing violent crime and “super-predators,”165 lawmakers and 
academics grew skeptical of parole and perceived it as a threat to public 
safety.166 By 2000, sixteen states abolished discretionary parole 
altogether, while another five abolished discretionary parole for certain 
violent crimes.167 This is not to say that today inmates do not leave 
prison before the end of the sentence that is imposed upon them. Inmates 
do leave prison before they have served their full sentences, but today 
when they do so it is typically because they have served a statutorily set 
percentage of their sentence—not because they have demonstrated to a 
parole board that they are prepared to re-join society.168 
In Florida, where Terrance Graham is serving his sentence, there is 
almost no discretionary parole. Through a series of legislative changes in 
the 1980s and 1990s,169 the state legislature created a system whereby 
defendants must serve at least eighty-five percent of their sentences 
before they are parole-eligible, and no inmate serving a life sentence will 
ever be parole-eligible.170 Because of the timing of the statutes, the 
State’s Parole Commission still hears parole petitions for a small number 
of inmates whose crimes were committed when discretionary parole was 
                                                     
INST. CORRECTIONS 1 (2011), http://static.nicic.gov/Library/024201.pdf [hereinafter The Future of 
Parole].  
164. Id. at 1–2.  
165. See John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 27, 
1995, at 23; see also generally WILLIAM J. BENNETT, JOHN J. DILULIO, JR. & JOHN P. WALTERS, 
BODY COUNT (1996) (advancing theory that new wave of young criminals would increase level of 
violence by end of century).  
166. See Jeff Bleich, The Politics of Prison Crowding, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1125, 1147–48 (1989) 
(describing states abolishing parole during this period); The Future of Parole, supra note 163, at 1–
2.  
167. Timothy A. Huges et al., Trends in State Parole, 1990–2000, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 1 (Oct. 
2001), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tsp00.pdf. 
168. For example, in Florida, inmates must serve eighty-five percent of their sentence before they 
are eligible for release. See Misconceptions About Florida Prisons, FLA. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, 
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/myths.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2011) (“Offenders who committed 
their offenses on or after October 1, 1995, are required to serve a minimum of 85% of their court-
imposed sentences prior to their release. Offenders released in January 2011 served an average of 
86.4% of their sentence.”).  
169. What is Parole?, FLA. PAROLE COMM’N, https://fpc.state.fl.us/Parole.htm (last visited Dec. 
26, 2011) (describing evolution of parole in Florida and who is eligible); see also FLA. PAROLE 
COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2009–2010, at 12–13 (2010) [hereinafter FLA. PAROLE COMM’N, 
ANNUAL REPORT].  
170. Doing Time, FLA. DEP’T CORRECTIONS (Aug. 2011), 
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/timeserv/doing/.  
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still in place.171 For most purposes, though, there is no parole in 
Florida.172 
As a threshold matter, parole must be available under state law in 
order to comport with Graham’s requirements.173 Immediate legislative 
reform is needed in states such as Florida, where parole is largely 
unavailable.174 What should such a statute look like? While juvenile 
advocates have been largely reluctant to articulate a number of years 
before which a juvenile should receive a parole hearing “out of fear that 
such a suggested ceiling would immediately become a norm,”175 they 
have made some suggestions. For example, some advocates have 
suggested that all inmates serving a juvenile life-without-parole sentence 
for a non-homicide crime receive a parole hearing when they turn thirty 
or when they have served ten years in prison.176 Lawmakers and 
lobbyists in Florida have suggested various models, allowing for parole 
under limited circumstances after twenty or twenty-five years of 
imprisonment.177 The optimal legislative solution is one that allows 
maximum flexibility in recognition of the reality that each inmate will 
present unique circumstances.178 For example, in 2009 Congressman 
                                                     
171. FLA. PAROLE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 169, at 20–22 (showing that only a 
small percent of Commission’s work deals with parole services). 
172. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2020 (2010) (“Because Florida 
has abolished its parole system . . . a life sentence gives a defendant no possibility of release unless 
he is granted executive clemency.”).  
173. As I described above in Part II.C, the Graham opinion requires states to provide Graham 
inmates with at least the possibility of release during their lifetime. If current state law precludes 
such a possibility, the law must be changed. See Leslie Patrice Wallace, “And I Don’t Know Why It 
Is that You Threw Your Life Away”: Abolishing Life Without Parole, the Supreme Court in Graham 
v. Florida Now Requires States to Give Juveniles Hope for a Second Chance, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 
35, 67–74 (2010) (arguing that Graham requires states to have active parole boards in place).  
174. See, e.g., supra notes 12–16 and accompanying text.  
175. John Kelly, States Begin Reacting to Ban on Juvenile Life Without Parole, YOUTH TODAY 
(Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.youthtoday.org/view_article.cfm?article_id=4469.  
176. See John Kelly, Will Ruling Save All Lifers?, YOUTH TODAY (June 1, 2010), 
http://www.youthtoday.org/view_article.cfm?article_id=4031 [hereinafter Kelly, Will Ruling Save 
All Lifers?] (discussing parole proposals). Juvenile advocates in Florida make two important 
arguments in favor of parole for Graham inmates after ten years or when they turn thirty. First, 
advocates cite the fact that before parole was abolished for convicted murderers, such offenders 
were eligible for parole after twenty-five years. The argument is that if adult homicide offenders 
were once eligible for parole after twenty-five years, non-homicide juvenile offenders should be 
eligible after a shorter period of time. Juvenile advocates also argue that the longer juveniles remain 
in prison, the less likely they are to be able to re-join society. See Kunerth, Juvenile Lifers Wait 25 
Years for Way Out, supra note 16.  
177. Zayas, supra note 11. Twenty-five years was the numbers of years served before a homicide 
convict could seek parole prior to the abolition of parole. Id.  
178. See generally Jody Kent & Beth Colgan, A Just Alternative to Sentencing Youth to Life in 
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Bobby Scott (D-Va.) proposed a bill that would require states housing 
juvenile life-without-parole offenders to grant “a meaningful opportunity 
for parole or other form of supervised release” at least once during their 
first fifteen years of incarceration and at least once every three years 
thereafter.179 One may argue that the initial period should be lower or 
higher,180 but Congressman Scott’s proposal recognizes that there should 
be an opportunity for review early in the juvenile’s sentence and that 
review should be ongoing. 
In the wake of Graham, state legislatures need to make parole reform 
a top priority, and ideally resultant parole policy should include a 
provision specific to juvenile offenders. While there has been much 
debate regarding so-called “Graham Laws” in Florida and in other states 
housing juvenile offenders like Terrance Graham, to date, no such 
legislation has been passed.181 
2. States Should Facilitate Graham’s Promise Through Conditions of 
Confinement 
Making parole available under state law is only the first step required 
of states that house Graham inmates. The Graham decision demands 
that states provide juvenile non-homicide offenders a “meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release,”182 and a meaningful opportunity to 
rehabilitate themselves prior to and in preparation for that parole 
hearing.183 In order to do so, many—if not all—states that house 
offenders like Graham need to critically examine and potentially 
overhaul prison conditions for juvenile offenders. 
In Graham, Justice Kennedy wrote that “[t]he juvenile should not be 
deprived of the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-
                                                     
Prison Without the Possibility of Parole, AM. CONST. SOC’Y 8 (Mar. 2010), 
http://www.acslaw.org/files/Kent%20Colgan%20Juvenile%20Life%20Issue%20Brief_0.pdf 
(proposing “periodic review” of each inmate after at least ten years in prison).  
179. Juvenile Justice Accountability and Improvement Act of 2009, H.R. 2289, 111th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2009), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:H.R.2289:.  
180. See, e.g., Kent & Colgan, supra note 178, at 8 (arguing for review possibly after ten years).  
181. See, e.g., supra notes 176–177 and accompanying text (discussing lawmakers’ attempts to 
enact legislation post-Graham); see also Paul Hammel, Lawmakers Reject Bill on Juvenile Lifers, 
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Apr. 8, 2011, at 1B (discussing failure of such bill in Omaha); Don 
Thompson, Bills Target California Prisons’ Inspector General, CBS SACRAMENTO (May 1, 2011), 
http://sacramento.cbslocal.com/2011/05/01/bills-target-state-prisons-inspector-general/ (discussing 
proposed legislation in California).  
182. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).  
183. Id. at 2029–30; see also Wallace, supra note 173, at 75 (discussing rehabilitation). 
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recognition of human worth and potential.”184 Without even the 
possibility of future release, he further explained, a juvenile offender 
may have no incentive to “become a responsible individual” or to 
engage in the “considered reflection which is the foundation for remorse, 
renewal, and rehabilitation.”185 Above and beyond the idea that the 
possibility of release may incentivize individual reform, Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion reflects an expectation that prisons actually enable 
such reform. As he explained, “[i]n some prisons . . . the system itself 
becomes complicit in the lack of development . . . [by] withhold[ing] 
counseling, education, and rehabilitation programs for those who are 
ineligible for parole consideration.”186 In light of the Court’s emphasis 
on allowing juvenile offenders the opportunity to “achieve maturity”187 
and to “reconcil[e] with society,”188 states must recognize that a parole 
hearing—or even release after a parole hearing—does not address these 
goals. Rather, these goals require substantive measures during 
incarceration that would potentially allow a juvenile to rejoin society. 
Juvenile offenders who are prosecuted as adults and incarcerated in 
adult facilities currently have little opportunity for rehabilitation. First, 
adult prisons rarely offer inmates the range of rehabilitative resources 
required to treat inmates’ underlying conditions, such as substance abuse 
and mental illness.189 Even when there are rehabilitative resources 
available, priority is given to those inmates approaching the end of their 
sentences, rather than to inmates serving life or life-without-parole 
sentences.190 Second, adult prisons pose significant physical and mental 
health risks to juvenile offenders.191 Many states that house juvenile 
                                                     
184. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032.  
185. Id.  
186. Id. at 2032–33; see also id. at 2029–30.  
187. Id. at 2032. 
188. Id.  
189. Christopher Mallett, Death Is Not Different: The Transfer of Juvenile Offenders to Adult 
Criminal Courts, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 523, 532 (2007) (“[A]dult prison systems offer few treatment 
modalities to inmates.”). 
190. Kunerth, ‘Lifers’ Sentenced as Teens Get 2nd Chance, supra note 8 (noting that those 
serving life terms “go to the end of the line” to receive rehabilitative resources). 
191. See generally Editorial, Raising Children Behind Bars, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2007, at A22; 
Jailing Juveniles: The Dangers of Incarcerating Youth in Adult Jails in America, CAMPAIGN FOR 
YOUTH JUST. (2007), 
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/CFYJNR_JailingJuveniles.pdf [hereinafter 
Jailing Juveniles]; The Rest of Their Lives: Life Without Parole for Child Offenders in the United 
States, AMNESTY INT’L (2005), 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/therestoftheirlives.pdf [hereinafter The Rest of 
Their Lives].  
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offenders in adult facilities have no regulations in place to protect or 
separate juveniles from adult inmates.192 As a result, sexual and physical 
assaults are a common experience for juvenile offenders in adult prisons. 
A 2006 study reports that twenty-one percent of victims of substantiated 
inmate-on-inmate sexual violence in jail were under the age of eighteen, 
even though juvenile inmates constitute only one percent of inmates in 
adult jails.193 Those who are not victims of sexual assault often feel 
pressure to engage in physical violence and other coping mechanisms in 
order to ward off sexual assault.194 Because the experience of adult 
prison is so horrific for juvenile offenders, inmates under eighteen have 
the highest suicide rate among all inmates.195 These deplorable 
conditions of confinement are not amenable to the “considered reflection 
which is the foundation for remorse, renewal, and rehabilitation.”196 
What conditions of confinement would facilitate the Graham Court’s 
goals of rehabilitation and possible reentry into society?197 To begin, 
developmental psychology and criminology research suggest that most 
youth can be rehabilitated.198 Social science research indicates that the 
crime rate peaks at age seventeen, and that most youth outgrow their 
criminal tendencies.199 Moreover, most juvenile offenders have had 
unhealthy, unstable, and abusive home environments, and they need to 
experience a healthy environment of emotional expression, routine, 
boundaries, and consequences.200 Ideally, “[h]ealthy social contexts” 
                                                     
192. Jailing Juveniles, supra note 191, at 24–37 (discussing dangers for youths in adult jails and 
identifying policies state-by-state).  
193. Id. at 13.  
194. Id.; see also The Rest of their Lives, supra note 191, at 76–81.  
195. See Jailing Juveniles, supra note 191, at 10 (noting juveniles in jail are also nineteen times 
more likely to commit suicide than adults in the same general population).  
196. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010).  
197. Improving juvenile conditions of confinement is only one of many issues that demand 
reform within the realm of juvenile justice. A full discussion of juveniles in the criminal justice 
system is outside the scope of this paper. There is a wide body of literature on the topic. See, e.g., 
Barry C. Feld, A Century of Juvenile Justice: A Work in Progress or a Revolution that Failed?, 34 
N. KY. L. REV. 189 (2007); Christopher Slobogin & Mark R. Fondacaro, Juvenile Justice: The 
Fourth Option, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2009); The Consequences Aren’t Minor: The Impact of Trying 
Youth as Adults and Strategies for Reform, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUST. (2007), 
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/CFYJNR_ConsequencesMinor.pdf; Jailing 
Juveniles, supra note 191.  
198. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Social Welfare and Fairness in Juvenile Crime 
Regulation, 71 LA. L. REV. 35, 64 (2010) (noting that only five percent of youth are incipient career 
criminals). 
199. Id.  
200. See id. at 65 (discussing the need for “[h]ealthy social contexts” and enabling the “process of 
development toward psychosocial maturity”).  
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entail positive authority figures, socialization with peers, and 
participation in education, extracurricular, and employment activities 
that facilitate “autonomous decision-making and critical-thinking 
skills.”201 
The State of Missouri created a juvenile justice system that has many 
of these attributes and is now viewed as a national model.202 Juvenile 
inmates are kept in small facilities, as close to their home as possible so 
that they can maintain family connections.203 The staff members are 
highly trained and experienced, and the model is based on respect and 
dignity: “the system uses a rehabilitative and therapeutic model that 
works towards teaching the young people to make positive, lasting 
changes in their behavior.”204 The juvenile offenders are housed in dorm 
rooms, rather than cell blocks, and their daily routine consists of school, 
chores, and therapy—a routine that Missouri’s Division of Youth 
Services Director says is “much tougher than . . . sitting in a cell.”205 
While New York State’s youth prisons have an eighty-nine percent 
recidivism rate for boys, “fewer than 8 percent of the youths in the 
Missouri system return again after their release, and fewer than 8 percent 
go on to adult prison.”206 Despite what some skeptics have said about the 
ability to replicate this model, Missouri’s youth prisons serve juveniles 
from racially diverse, urban areas; they contend with mental illness; and 
even very serious offenders are treated with the same model of respect 
and rehabilitation.207 Already, Louisiana, New Mexico, the District of 
Columbia, and Santa Clara County, California, have begun to study and 
replicate the Missouri youth prison model.208 In the wake of Graham, 
other states should follow suit in order to create conditions of 
                                                     
201. See id.  
202. See generally Douglas E. Abrams, Reforming Juvenile Delinquency Treatment to Enhance 
Rehabilitation, Personal Accountability and Public Safety, 84 OR. L. REV. 1001, 1064–70 (2005) 
(describing the Missouri model and its success); see also Charlyn Bohland, No Longer a Child: 
Juvenile Incarceration in America, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 193, 221–24 (2011).  
203. Bohland, supra note 202, at 223.  
204. Marian Wright Edelman, Juvenile Justice Reform: Making the “Missouri Model” an 
American Model, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 15, 2010, 9:50 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marian-wright-edelman/juvenile-justice-reform-m_b_498976.html.  
205. Chris Cuomo et al., Missouri’s New Take on Juvenile Justice, ABCNEWS.COM (Sept. 8, 
2009), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/missouris-juvenile-justice-system/story?id=8511600.  
206. Edelman, supra note 204. 
207. Id.  
208. Richard A. Mendel, The Missouri Model: Reinventing the Practice of Rehabilitating 
Youthful Offenders, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND. 51–52 (2010), 
http://www.aecf.org/~/media/Pubs/Initiatives/Juvenile%20Detention%20Alternatives%20Initiative/
MOModel/MO_Fullreport_webfinal.pdf. 
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confinement that will enable maturity, rehabilitation, and fitness to re-
join society. 
In sum, as state judges and lawmakers struggle with the task of 
implementing Graham on the ground, they should bear in mind the 
logical consequences of the decision. Not only does Graham apply more 
widely than one may initially assume, but also the decision requires both 
short- and long-term implementation measures. Graham inmates should 
receive effective representation at a resentencing hearing, and they 
should receive a sentence that leaves open the possibility of release 
rather than one that exacts the longest sentence technically permissible. 
In the long run, states housing Graham inmates need to revisit and 
potentially overhaul their parole policies and their conditions of 
confinement for juvenile offenders. 
III. GRAHAM GOING FORWARD 
Part II addressed several urgent collateral issues that flow from the 
Graham decision, and advocated for courts to implement Graham in 
specific ways immediately. Over time, how courts deal with discrete 
issues, like the ones raised in Part II, on a case-by-case basis may 
improve or worsen the criminal justice system in the aggregate. This Part 
addresses the relationship between Graham and the criminal justice 
system on a national scale. Specifically, this Part suggests that: (1) 
Graham ought to be viewed as a symptom of our national criminal 
justice failings; and (2) Graham, read alongside the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 2011 decision in Brown v. Plata, may signal the Court’s 
increasing willingness to address criminal justice failings that it once left 
to the states to resolve. 
A. Graham Reflects Broader Criminal Justice Failings 
In order to generate meaningful reform in the long run, Graham needs 
to be understood as a symptom of our nation’s ongoing criminal justice 
failings. Specifically, it reflects an over-reliance on incarceration in the 
United States and an entrenched indigent defense crisis. 
To begin, our nation leads the world in its rate of incarceration.209 
There are more than 9.8 million people incarcerated worldwide, and 2.29 
million are in the United States.210 Florida—where most of the Graham 
                                                     
209. Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population List, KING’S C. LONDON INT’L CENTRE FOR 
PRISON STUD. 1 (8th ed. 2009) (citing incarceration rate of 756 per 100,000 in population), 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/downloads/wppl-8th_41.pdf. 
210. Id. 
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inmates are housed—“leads the nation in incarceration rates and 
stringency in law and sentencing, making it the most punitive of the 50 
states as measured by more than 40 variables, including average prison 
sentences, life imprisonment, and prison conditions.”211 While Florida 
may lead the nation in this regard, it is by no means an outlier in its 
reliance on incarceration. California’s ongoing prison overcrowding has 
garnered national media attention and an order from the U.S. Supreme 
Court requiring a prison population reduction.212 Alabama, among the 
top five states in the nation for its rate of incarceration, has seen its 
prison population grow from 6000 in 1979 to 28,000 today.213 Between 
2000 and 2004, Alabama increased its spending on prisons by almost 
45% while increasing its school budget only 7.5% in that same period.214 
We are a nation that relies far too heavily on the blunt instrument of 
incarceration to address criminal justice failings that require holistic 
reform.215 
At the same time, our judicial system continues to tolerate ongoing, 
systemic violations of the poor person’s right to counsel.216 Graham 
again is a good example of this problem. More than eighty percent of 
                                                     
211. A Billion Dollars and Growing: Why Prison Bonding Is Tougher on Florida’s Taxpayers 
than on Crime, COLLINS CENTER FOR PUB. POL’Y 5 (2011) (citation omitted), 
http://www.collinscenter.org/resource/resmgr/prison_bonding/prisonbondingreport.pdf.  
212. See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing the Brown v. Plata decision); see also Jack Dolan, 
No New Taxes for Prisons, Residents Say, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 2011, at A1; Adam Liptak, Justices, 
5-4, Tell California to Cut Prison Crowding, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2011, at A1.  
213. Excessive Sentences, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, 
http://www.eji.org/eji/prisons/excessivesentences (last visited Dec. 27, 2011).  
214. Id.  
215. For example, mental illness and substance abuse are underlying issues for many inmates, 
and incarceration alone cannot address these issues—in fact, it may exacerbate them. A recent 
government report found that 56% of state prisoners and 45% of federal prisoners have a mental 
health problem. See Doris J. James & Lauren E. Glaze, Mental Health Problems of Prison and Jail 
Inmates, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 1 (Sept. 2006), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf. 
Further, 74% of state prisoners who had a mental health problem also met the criteria for substance 
abuse or dependence. Id. Yet, state prisons devote far too few resources to mental health care. Only 
13% of state prisoners receive therapy or counseling; 10% receive psychotropic medication. Allen J. 
Beck & Laura M. Maruschak, Special Report: Mental Health Treatment in State Prisons, 2000, 
BUREAU JUST. STAT. 1 (July 2001), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhtsp00.pdf. Both the 
states and the federal government should focus more on preventing crime through mental health and 
substance abuse treatment rather than relying so heavily upon incarceration after the fact.  
216. See generally ABA Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, Gideon’s Broken 
Promise: America’s Continuing Quest for Equal Justice, AM. BAR ASS’N (2004), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclai
d_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf; Nat’l Right to Counsel 
Comm., Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to Counsel, 
CONST. PROJECT (Apr. 2009), http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf.  
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those who are prosecuted by the states are poor.217 Likewise, most of the 
Graham inmates in Florida are poor and were represented by public 
defenders.218 At every stage in the criminal process, people of color fare 
worse than white people.219 Similarly, the profile of the Graham inmates 
in Florida suggests that racial discrimination may have played a role in 
the inmates’ convictions and sentences. The Juvenile Life Without 
Parole Defense Resource Center has files for 96 of what they estimate to 
be 115 Graham inmates in Florida.220 Of the ninety-six inmates for 
whom they have files, ninety-two percent are black or Hispanic.221 
While Graham is a significant case for juvenile justice advocates and 
for Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, these statistics suggest that 
Graham is also an indictment of our nation’s indigent defense system. 
Many of the juveniles who were sentenced to life in prison in Florida for 
non-homicide crimes were mentally ill and enrolled in special education 
classes.222 At least one of them was borderline mentally retarded.223 The 
reason that these juveniles received these excessive sentences likely lies 
as much in the quality of their representation as it does in a Florida 
statute that authorized their sentence.224 In addition to shining a light on 
                                                     
217. Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National 
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1034 (2006).  
218. I have begun to compile data regarding the Graham inmates in Florida, including the docket 
sheets for these inmates. While the data set is still missing the dockets of a few inmates, among the 
inmates whose cases I have reviewed, almost all had a public defender. Public defender caseloads 
are notoriously high nationwide, usually resulting in sub-par representation. See, e.g., DONALD J. 
FAROLE & LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COUNTY-BASED AND LOCAL PUBLIC 
DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007, at 1 (2007) (noting that seventy-three percent of county-based public 
defender offices, including Florida, have caseloads that exceed the prevailing maximum). This is 
consistent with the mainstream press reports that the Graham inmates in Florida did not have 
adequate representation in the first place. See, e.g., Kelly, Will Ruling Save All Lifers?, supra note 
176 (quoting Jody Kent, director of the Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth, as saying that 
most of the inmates “did not have top-performing attorneys during the proceedings that landed them 
in prison for life” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
219. See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 16 (1998) (“At every step of the criminal process, there is evidence that 
African Americans are not treated as well as whites—both as victims of crime and as criminal 
defendants.”); see also id. at 16 n.10 (collecting sources on racial discrimination in the criminal 
justice system).  
220. Juveniles: Who’s in Prison?, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Apr. 2, 2011), 
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/local/crime/os-life-without-parole-barry-box-
20110402,0,4643866.story.  
221. Id.  
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. In a future work, I plan to examine these cases more closely and to search for patterns. How 
many times did counsel meet with their client? What kind of investigation, if any, was conducted in 
 
06 - WLR March 2012 Drinan Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/15/2012  12:08 PM 
2012] GRAHAM ON THE GROUND 85 
 
the state of juvenile justice in this country, the Graham decision should 
also augment the many voices who support broad, nationwide indigent 
defense reform.225 
B. Graham and Plata: The U.S. Supreme Court May Be Willing to 
Intervene in State Criminal Justice Matters that Are Egregious and 
Long-Standing 
As much as Graham reflects national criminal justice failings, the 
opinion also offers some grounds for hope on that same front. 
Specifically, when read alongside the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 
decision in Brown v. Plata, the Court appears increasingly willing to 
assert federal constitutional limits in areas that had typically been 
reserved for state judgment. 
In Brown v. Plata, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the question 
whether a three-judge panel in California acted properly under the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act in ordering California to reduce its prison 
population in the face of ongoing, systemic Eighth Amendment 
                                                     
these cases? How many witnesses, if any, were put on to offer mitigation evidence at sentencing? 
While this Article has focused on the immediate task of implementing Graham on the ground, the 
question of whether Terrance Graham, and the other inmates like him, had effective representation 
at trial still needs to be answered. For a general discussion of Florida’s ongoing right to counsel 
issues, see Wayne A. Logan, Litigating the Ghost of Gideon in Florida: Separation of Powers as a 
Tool to Achieve Indigent Defense Reform, 75 MO. L. REV. 885 (2010).  
225. Scholars and various organizations have documented the nation’s persistent indigent defense 
crisis. For recent reports discussing the crisis, see Backus & Marcus, supra note 217; ABA Standing 
Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, supra note 216; Robert C. Boruchowitz et al., Minor 
Crimes, Massive Waste: The Terrible Toll of America’s Broken Misdemeanor Courts, NAT’L ASS’N 
CRIM. DEF. LAW. (Apr. 2009), 
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates/misdemeanor/$FILE/Report.pdf [hereinafter 
Boruchowitz et al., Minor Crimes, Massive Waste]; Nat’l Right to Counsel Comm., supra note 216. 
In recent years, academics, practitioners, and politicians have proposed a number of creative and, in 
some cases, radical measures to address the nation’s ongoing criminal justice failings, particularly 
regarding access to counsel and sentencing. See, e.g., Cara H. Drinan, The National Right to 
Counsel Act: A Congressional Solution to the Nation’s Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 487 (2010) (arguing that Congress should enable systemic lawsuits in federal court that 
challenge state public defense systems); Joseph L. Hoffman & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the 
Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791 (2009) (arguing that grounds for 
federal habeas should be narrowed and resources saved should be dedicated to improving state 
indigent defense systems); Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: 
Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679 (2007) (arguing that 
appellate attorneys should be able to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims on appeal); Smart 
Reform Is Possible: States Reducing Incarceration Rates and Costs While Protecting Communities, 
AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 2011), 
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/smartreformispossible_web.pdf (describing several state models for 
reducing reliance on incarceration while saving taxpayers money and enhancing public safety).  
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violations.226 The three-judge panel ordered the prison population 
reduction after decades of litigation challenging a lack of adequate 
mental health and medical services for California inmates.227 The 
conditions at issue in California’s prisons were—and continue to be—
dire. Simply put, there are too many people in the prison system. 
California currently houses almost twice the number of inmates for 
which its facilities were designed.228 Because of this overcrowding, the 
Court determined that the state simply could not provide sufficient 
mental health and medical services.229 For example, “[b]ecause of a 
shortage of treatment beds, suicidal inmates may be held for prolonged 
periods in telephone-booth sized cages without toilets.”230 At the same 
time, inmates with serious medical conditions endured similar waits and 
conditions.231 The lower court heard testimony that, in one prison, up to 
fifty sick inmates could be held together in a twelve-by-twenty-foot cage 
for up to five hours awaiting treatment.232 Some prisons in California’s 
system had a backlog of up to 700 prisoners waiting to see a doctor.233 In 
light of this evidence and the case’s procedural history, the Court upheld 
the prison reduction order in a five-to-four decision.234 
As in Graham, Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, joined by the 
four liberal Justices on the Court.235 While the Plata opinion arguably 
lacks Graham’s aspirational tone, and, in particular, its discussion of 
hope, redemption, and self-reflection,236 the two opinions share several 
important threads. First, both opinions stand for the proposition that, at 
some point, state sovereignty and autonomy in criminal justice affairs 
must yield to the protection of individual rights. In Graham, the Court 
recognized that Florida is free to devise its own sentencing practices—
even if it stands practically alone in this country and in the world at large 
                                                     
226. 563 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1922–23 (2011).  
227. Id. at 1926–28 (citing the two consolidated actions in the case, one of which was filed in 
1990 and one of which was filed in 2001).  
228. Id. at 1923–24 (“California’s prisons are designed to house a population just under 80,000, 
but at the time of the three-judge court’s decision the population was almost double that. The State’s 
prisons had operated at around 200% of design capacity for at least 11 years.”). 
229. Id. at 1923–26.  
230. Id. at 1924.  
231. Id. at 1925.  
232. Id.  
233. Id. at 1933.  
234. Id. at 1947.  
235. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. 
236. See supra notes 184–188 and accompanying text.  
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in doing so237—but those practices must comport with the 
Constitution.238 In Plata, the Court again recognized that California is 
free to make criminal justice decisions internally, such as incarcerating 
technical parole violators and employing its three strikes laws,239 but it 
must also comport with the Eighth Amendment in its conditions of 
confinement.240 The opinions thus reflect a check on state autonomy. 
Second, both opinions reflect an effort to protect the dignity of the 
voiceless and politically powerless, something that elected officials and 
elected judges are not always well-suited to do.241 In the last twenty to 
thirty years, elected lawmakers have pursued tough-on-crime policies in 
order to satisfy the electorate.242 Evidence suggests that elected judges—
like elected lawmakers—may do the same in order to earn voter 
approval.243 Specifically, many judges hesitate to render a defendant-
friendly decision, as elections sometimes hinge on the outcome of one 
criminal case.244 In light of these realities, elected judges and lawmakers 
                                                     
237. In Graham, Justice Kennedy noted that Florida’s practice of sentencing non-homicide 
juvenile offenders to life in prison without parole was an outlier within the United States, Graham v. 
Florida, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2024 (2010) (noting that 77 out of 123 inmates nationwide 
were serving the challenged sentence in Florida), and was rare worldwide, id. at 2033 (noting that 
only eleven nations authorized the sentence and only two, including the United States, imposed it in 
practice).  
238. Id. at 2033.  
239. Jack Dolan & Carol J. Williams, No Easy Fix for State Prison Crisis, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 
2011, at A1 (noting that policy changes are required to stem the number of people entering 
California’s prisons and citing parole violations and three-strikes as driving factors).  
240. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1947 (2011). 
241. Elected officials in general reflect the sentiment of the majority. See JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135 (1980) (“No matter how open 
the process, those with most of the votes are in a position to vote themselves advantages at the 
expense of the others, or otherwise to refuse to take their interests into account.”).  
242. Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REV. 69, 92 (2011) 
(“Because there is no political benefit from appearing soft on crime and because there may be quite 
a cost, politicians compete for the tough-on-crime label by continually ‘enacting ever more 
numerous, more severe, and more expansive criminal laws.’” (citations omitted)); Michael A. 
Simons, Sense and Sentencing: Our Imprisonment Epidemic, 25 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 153, 157–58 
(2010) (discussing recent increase in rate of incarceration and related “tough on crime” rhetoric).  
243. See Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 VA. 
L. REV. 719, 731–40 (2010) (discussing the evidence that suggests elected judges are, in fact, 
influenced by majority preferences, especially in comparison to appointed judges); see also John 
Schwartz, Effort Begun to Abolish the Election of Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2009, at A12 
(describing the lack of independence with elected judges). For a discussion of the problem of “judge 
override” in combination with the dynamic of elected judges, see The Death Penalty in Alabama: 
Judge Override, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE 13–14 (July 2011), 
http://eji.org/eji/files/Override_Report.pdf. 
244. Anthony Champagne, Judicial Selection from a Political Science Perspective, 64 ARK. L. 
REV. 221, 236–37 (2011) (citing two studies that found “judges in politically competitive states 
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may be reluctant to champion the cause of prison inmates. Yet, Justice 
Kennedy’s opinions in both Graham and Plata articulate the unique 
concerns of these groups in a way that would not resonate on the 
campaign trail. In Graham, Justice Kennedy speaks of prisons’ 
complicity in juvenile inmates’ failure to rehabilitate and insists on 
giving these inmates at least a chance to improve themselves.245 
Similarly, in Plata, not only does Justice Kennedy’s opinion document 
several representative stories of health care failures that caused serious 
harm or death,246 but his opinion also includes photographs of 
California’s dire prison reality.247 If nothing else, Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion in both cases shines a light on social problems that may 
otherwise be eclipsed by majoritarian issues of the day. 
Third, both opinions require systemic reform at the state level but 
leave implementation of such reform to state discretion in the first 
instance. The Graham opinion, for example, is virtually silent on issues 
of implementation, as Justice Thomas noted in his dissent and as 
discussed earlier in Part II.248 Similarly, Kennedy’s opinion in Plata 
makes clear that California’s prison population must be reduced, but it 
leaves the question of how that reduction will happen to state decision-
makers in the first instance.249 At the same time, the Plata Court’s 
opinion also cautions the district court to “exercise its jurisdiction to 
                                                     
might be inclined to be sensitive to an electorate’s tough-on-crime views”); Amanda Frost, 
Defending the Majoritarian Court, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 757, 760 (2010) (“Empirical studies 
demonstrate that elected judges issue longer sentences and are more likely to impose the death 
penalty as elections approach, presumably because they fear being labeled ‘soft on crime’ by their 
opponent in the next election. Their concerns are reasonable; judges have lost election because they 
were perceived as too lenient on criminal defendants.” (citation omitted)).  
245. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032–33 (2010).  
246. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1924 (2011) (“A psychiatric expert 
reported observing an inmate who had been held in such a cage for nearly 24 hours, standing in a 
pool of his own urine, unresponsive and nearly catatonic. Prison officials explained they had ‘no 
place to put him.’” (citation omitted)); see also id. at 1925 (“A prisoner with severe abdominal pain 
died after a 5-week delay in referral to a specialist; a prisoner with ‘constant and extreme’ chest pain 
died after an 8-hour delay in evaluation by a doctor; and a prisoner died of testicular cancer after a 
‘failure of MDs to work up for cancer in a young man with 17 months of testicular pain.’” (citation 
omitted)).  
247. Id. at 1949–50 (images show severe overcrowding in makeshift “cells” and “dry 
cages/holding cells for people waiting for mental health crisis bed”). For an interesting piece on the 
question of whether the appended photographs help or hurt the majority’s position, see Dahlia 
Lithwick, Show, Don’t Tell: Do Photographs of California’s Overcrowded Prisons Belong in a 
Supreme Court Decision About Those Prisons?, SLATE (May 23, 2011), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2295331.  
248. See supra text accompanying note 4. 
249. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1946–47. 
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accord the State considerable latitude to find mechanisms and make 
plans to correct the violations in a prompt and effective way consistent 
with public safety.”250 Whether the balance struck in these decisions can 
be implemented effectively remains to be seen.251 
Finally, both the Graham and Plata decisions force states to 
internalize more fully the costs of their crime and sentencing polices. 
Graham, as argued in Part II, demands more than a parole hearing at 
some point in an inmate’s life; rather, it requires the states to facilitate 
self-reflection, maturity, and growth through conditions of 
confinement.252 If applied strictly, that requirement is expensive, at least 
in the short run.253 Accordingly, it may cause Florida state officials to 
consider more closely the economics of transferring a juvenile to adult 
court or sentencing a juvenile offender to a lengthy prison sentence. 
Plata may have similar repercussions in California. If prison officials 
must meet the medical and psychological needs of the system’s bloated 
population in a timely manner, prison officials will need more staff, 
more space, and more money to facilitate both.254 A legislature faced 
with additional funding requests may reconsider the feasibility of 
incarcerating so many people and explore alternatives to such mass 
incarceration.255 In sum, both Plata and Graham impose requirements on 
                                                     
250. Id. at 1946. 
251. For example, in order to comply with the Plata mandate, counties will now bear a much 
larger burden for managing inmates and parolees than they have traditionally borne. Now, offenders 
who commit non-violent, non-serious, and non-sexual offenses will be sent to county jails instead of 
state prisons. George Skelton, Chronic Prison Underfunding Leads to More Local Burdens, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2011, at A2, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/06/local/la-me-cap-
prisons-20111006/2. Current state inmates serving time for these so-called “non-non-non” offenses, 
will be supervised by county probation officials when they are released on parole. Editorial, Here 
Come the Inmates, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2011, at A12. There is great debate and concern over 
whether the counties will have sufficient funding and experience to provide rehabilitation and 
reentry resources for these inmates. Id.  
252. See supra Part II.C–D. 
253. For example, while it may cost more in the short term to provide inmates with education, 
substance abuse treatment, counseling, parenting skills, and vocational training, these are the very 
services critical to their successful reentry. See generally Edward E. Rhine & Anthony C. 
Thompson, The Reentry Movement in Corrections: Resiliency, Fragility and Prospects, 47 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 177 (2011) (describing the recent successes in the reentry movement along with its fragility 
in part due to the fact that reentry goals are hard to measure in the short run).  
254. To the extent that overcrowding and related understaffing led to Eighth Amendment 
violations in Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1926 (“[T]he prisons were ‘seriously and chronically understaffed,’ 
and had ‘no effective method for ensuring . . . the competence of their staff’ . . . The prisons had 
failed to implement necessary suicide-prevention procedures, ‘due in large measure to the severe 
understaffing.’” (citations omitted)), more resources will be needed to address these issues.  
255. See generally Boruchowitz et al., Minor Crimes, Massive Waste, supra note 225; Smart 
Reform is Possible, supra note 225; see also Robert C. Boruchowitz, Diverting and Reclassifying 
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states that may prompt legislative reform—reform that historically has 
been hard to achieve.256 
Thus, while the Graham decision reflects broader criminal justice 
failings, when read alongside the Court’s recent Plata decision, it may 
also indicate hope regarding criminal justice reform. 
CONCLUSION 
While many scholars have examined the long-term influence that the 
Graham decision may have on Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and on 
sentencing practices,257 this Article addresses the immediate tasks of 
implementing Graham on the ground. Specifically, it argues for courts 
and legislatures to read the Graham opinion holistically and to embrace 
its vision of hope and rehabilitation for juvenile offenders—even serious 
offenders. 
The future for inmates like Terrance Graham remains unclear. Since 
September 2010, the Juvenile Life Without Parole Project at Barry 
University has been working to identify inmates in Florida affected by 
the Graham decision and to secure legal representation for those 
inmates.258 To date, the Project has identified more than 100 inmates in 
Florida who are entitled to a new sentence after Graham.259 All but a 
few of those inmates currently have legal representation, and a handful 
of inmates have obtained significant relief as a result of their 
resentencing hearings.260 
And yet there remains much work to be done. One inmate was 
resentenced to a term of 170 years;261 another received a ninety-two-year 
sentence.262 Legal appeals of these “virtual life sentences” are in the 
                                                     
Misdemeanors Could Save $1 Billion Per Year: Reducing the Need for and Cost of Appointed 
Counsel, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Dec. 2010), http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Boruchowitz_-
_Misdemeanors.pdf.  
256. The Plata Court noted that the two consolidated cases under its review had been in the 
courts for decades, yet had failed to generate reform. 131 S. Ct. at 1926–27 (One case had been filed 
in 1990, the other in 2001.).  
257. See supra Part I.B. 
258. Telephone Interview with Ilona Vila, supra note 121. 
259. Id.  
260. Id. Days before this Article went to press, Terrance Graham was resentenced to twenty-five 
years in prison. Email from Bryan Gowdy, Terrance Graham’s Lawyer, Creed & Gowdy Appellate 
Law Firm (Feb. 24, 2012, 5:55 PM) (on file with author).  
261. Wiles, supra note 8. 
262. Alexandra Zayas, No Life Term? Then 65 Years, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 18, 2010, at 
1B (stating the sixty-five-year sentence is to be served consecutively with a twenty-seven-year 
sentence from another county). For a video of the sentencing judge in this case criticizing the U.S. 
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works.263 While inmates await resentencing hearings, lawyers must 
challenge their conditions of confinement. Several facilities in Florida 
have no rehabilitative programs,264 and the Florida Department of 
Corrections maintains the policy that inmates are ineligible for 
rehabilitative programs until they are three years from their release 
date.265 Accordingly, Graham inmates awaiting a resentencing hearing 
cannot access rehabilitation services, yet they need those services in 
order to demonstrate maturity and growth. Lawyers representing 
Graham inmates must articulate this catch-22 to the courts and challenge 
these policies. 
There may be a silver lining to this painful process of implementing 
the Graham decision in Florida. The Project has brought together public 
defender offices, private counsel in Florida, and pro bono lawyers from 
across the nation to represent Graham inmates in their resentencing 
hearings. This kind of collaboration is a positive development. 
Hopefully, as these lawyers pursue their clients’ legal claims they will 
generate a wider conversation about juveniles in the criminal justice 
system—a conversation that challenges the prosecution of children as 
adults and exposes the juvenile experience of adult prison. 
 
                                                     
Supreme Court’s decision in Graham, see Warren Elly, Judge Blasts Supreme Court During Teen’s 
Resentencing, MYFOX TAMPA BAY (Nov. 17, 2010, 6:03 PM), 
http://www.myfoxtampabay.com/dpp/news/local/hillsborough/walle-resentencing-tharpe-111710.  
263. Telephone Interview with Ilona Vila, supra note 121.  
264. Id. 
265. Id. 
